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WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESIDENTIAL 
SUPREMACY? 
Kathleen Tipler*
LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEANINGS (UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS 2017). PP.
352. HARDCOVER $39.95. 
LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT OBAMA: CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND 
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS (UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS 2018). PP. 296.
HARDCOVER $45.00. PAPERBACK $24.95.
HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE 
POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
2015). PP. 272. HARDCOVER $45.00. PAPERBACK $36.00.
This moment is an interesting one in the history of presidential power. The current 
President has displayed an unusually dismissive attitude towards legislative constraints. 
He has openly asked for foreign assistance in elections.1 When Congress was unwilling to 
provide him funds for his desired wall on the US-Mexico border, he declared an 
emergency in order to redirect funds from the Department of Defense and the Treasury.2
+HVXJJHVWHGDZKLVWOHEORZHUZKRIROORZHGVWDWXWRU\SURFHGXUHZDVDNLQWRD³VS\´ZKR
must be discovered, and then reminded his audience what used to be done to spies and 
WKRVHZKRHQJDJHGLQ³WUHDVRQ´3 He is famous for saying that he could shoot someone on 
Fifth Avenue and not lose any voters.4 While the open disregard for, and undermining of, 
                                                          
*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma. 
 1. Aaron Blake, Trump Just Mused Openly About Committing What Might Well Be a Crime, WASH. POST
(June 13, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/13/why-trumps-comment-about-accepting-
foreign-help-is-so-astounding/. 
 2. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html. 
 3. Eli Stokols,Listen: Audio of Trump Discussing Whistleblower at Private Event: ‘That’s Close to a Spy’,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-26/trump-at-private-breakfast-
who-gave-the-whistle-blower-the-information-because-thats-almost-a-spy. 
 4. Ali Vitali, Trump Says He Could ‘Shoot Somebody’ and Still Maintain Support, NBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 
2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-says-he-could-shoot-somebody-still-maintain-
support-n502911. 
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294 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:293 
laws, norms, and institutional practices is distinct, the Trump administration should not be 
considered an anomaly or outlier in constitutional politics. Constitutional scholars cannot 
explain away the Trump administration as the product of forces exogenous to, or outside 
of, constitutional politics, as the Trump administration is built upon the prior legitimation 
of presidential supremacy. 
The expansion of executive power over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is 
an oft discussed topic in constitutional studies. Frequently, Congress is blamed for 
H[SDQGHGH[HFXWLYHSRZHULWVHHPVDSUHVLGHQWZLOO³EHDVELJDPDQDVKHFDQ´(or as big 
a woman as she can), so it is up to Congress to check any unconstitutional expansion of 
executive power.5 The division of powers between the branches encourages Congress to 
jealously protect its own powers from executive encroachment, as Madison explained in 
Federalist 51; and, these critics of Congress argue, the legislature, unlike the judiciary, is 
an explicitly political branch and has enormous powers at its disposal. 
While not letting Congress off the hook, Louis Fisher, in Supreme Court Expansion 
of Presidential Power: Unconstitutional Leanings and President Obama: Constitutional 
Aspirations and Executive Actions, and Heidi Kitrosser, in Reclaiming Accountability: 
Transparency, Executive Power, and the U.S. Constitution, emphasize the role of other 
actors in legitimating the expansion of executive power. As its title indicates, Supreme 
Court Expansion of Presidential Power KLJKOLJKWV WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V UROHZKLOH WKH
Supreme Court is his main target, Fisher also uses this book to draw attention to the role 
played by popular and scholarly accounts of presidential power. In President Obama,
Fisher continues his criticism of the judiciary and academics, but his main focus is 
presidential responsibility. Fisher argues that Obama turned too frequently to executive 
DFWLRQVWRDFFRPSOLVKKLVJRDOVGHVSLWH2EDPD¶VHDUOLHUFULWLFLVPVRIWKH*HRUJH:%XVK
(Bush II) administration. Heidi Kitrosser, in Reclaiming Accountability, likewise places 
blame on scholarly accounts of executive power, which are too easily accepted by the 
media and the public. 
Read together, these three books offer compelling support that responsibility for 
expanded presidential powers lies with many actors because many actors are complicit in 
legitimizing that expansion. In taking aim at these theories of legitimation, Fisher and 
Kitrosser say not only who is responsible for expanded executive power, but what is 
responsible: namely, the privileging of a formalistic approach to the separation of powers 
over a substantive approach, such that mechanisms for sharing power and responsibilities 
between the branches²mechanisms like the legislative veto or judicial review of state 
secrets²are seen as unconstitutional violations of executive power. 
In Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power )LVKHU¶V H[SOLFLW JRDO LV WR
reveal the extent to which the Supreme Court has contributed to the unconstitutional 
expansion of executive power.6 He argues that for much of US history, the Supreme Court 
was equally deferential to Congress and the President. But after 1936, Fisher claims, the 
Supreme Court deferred more to the executive and less to Congress, upsetting the balance 
                                                          
 5. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1908). 
 6. LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEANINGS
xi (2017). 
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of power between the branches.7 )LVKHU¶V DLP ZLWK WKLV ERRN DSSHDUV WR EH ODUJHO\
descriptive rather than causal. He contrasts his history of presidential power and Supreme 
Court acquiescence with the histories of those who advocate a unitary theory of the 
executive or exclusive executive powers in foreign affairs; proponents of these theories of 
expansive executive power frequently trace that power to the Founding and early republic, 
DQG)LVKHU¶VDFFRXQWLQWHQWLRQDOO\XQGHUPLQHVWKHLUDUJXPHQWV
Fisher argues that national welfare is best achieved, and constitutional principles are 
best protected, when courts do not assert an overly formalistic view of separation of 
powers²ZKDW )LVKHU FDOOV ³WRWDO VHSDUDWLRQ´²and do not uphold many powers and 
obligations as exclusively within the realm of the executive.8 Supreme Court Expansion 
of Presidential Power is largely organized chronologically, and Fisher persuasively 
demonstrates that the Court (and Congress) have not always had such a deferential attitude 
toward executive power. He brings up many examples when the public, the judiciary, and 
Congress have pushed back against broad assertions of executive power, as when jurors 
ZRXOGQRWFRQYLFW IHOORZFLWL]HQVXQGHU*HRUJH:DVKLQJWRQ¶V1HXWUDOLW\3URFODPDWLRQ
UHMHFWLQJ D SUHVLGHQW¶V SRZHU WR XQLODWHUDOO\ PDNH FULPLQDO ODZ9; or when Alexander 
Hamilton and Chief Justice John Marshall both rejected as unconstitutional President 
$GDPV¶GHYLDWLRQIURP&RQJUHVV¶VSHFLILFEORFNDGHLQVWUXFWLRQVGXULQJWKH4XDVL-War10;
RUZKHQ&RQJUHVVVXESRHQDHGWKHEURWKHURI3UHVLGHQW+DUGLQJ¶V$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOGXULQJ
the Teapot Dome Scandal, and the Supreme Court upheld congressional power to do so.11
What happened in 1936 that initiated judicial deference toward, and thus 
legitimation of, expansive executive power? In 1936, the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.12 For Fisher, Curtiss-Wright is both a 
turning point and an exemplary case, one which he returns to repeatedly in Supreme Court 
Expansion of Presidential Power as well as in his other book discussed in this review, 
President Obama. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice SXWKHUODQGZKRZURWHWKHRSLQLRQ³FKRVH
to go beyond the necessities of the case to announce a broad grant of power to the President 
LQ H[WHUQDO DIIDLUV´ DQG VXSSRUWHG WKLV EURDG JUDQW RI SRZHUZLWK D EODWDQWO\ LQFRUUHFW
interpretation of a speech by John Marshall in 1800.13 In this speech, Marshall described 
3UHVLGHQW-RKQ$GDPVDV³WKHVROHRUJDQRIWKHQDWLRQLQLWVH[WHUQDOUHODWLRQV´14 Properly 
contextualized, it is clear that Marshall meant that presidents are the sole organ for 
implementation of the law; but Sutherland misdescribed it in Curtiss-Wright as meaning 
that Marshall²then a member of the House of Representatives, later Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court²XQGHUVWRRG WKDW SUHVLGHQWV KDG ³SOHQDU\ DQG H[FOXVLYH DXWKRULW\ RYHU
IRUHLJQ DIIDLUV´15 As Fisher shows, the sole-organ doctrine had staying power, being 
repeated by legislators and courts alike, despite a continuous stream of academic articles 
                                                          
 7. Id.
 8. Id. at 63. 
 9. Id. at 25. 
 10. Id. at 27±28. 
11. FISHER, supra note 6, at 60. 
 12. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
13. FISHER, supra note 6, at 67. 
 14. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). 
 15. FISHER, supra note 6, at 67. 
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SRLQWLQJ ERWK WR 6XWKHUODQG¶V LQFRUUHFW LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI0DUVKDOO DQG WR WKH IDFW WKDW
6XWKHUODQG¶s interpretation was dicta and not a central holding. For Fisher, Curtiss-Wright
H[HPSOLILHVKRZVORSS\GLFWD³FDQHYHQWXDOO\EHDFFHSWHGDVWKHKROGLQJ´DQGVRFKDQJH
the boundary between the legitimate and illegitimate exercise of power to the detriment of 
the Constitution and national welfare.16
Recent books, such as Stephen Griffin¶VLong Wars and the Constitution17 and 
0DULDK=HLVEHUJ¶VWar Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority,18 have a timeline 
IRUWKHH[SDQVLRQRIH[HFXWLYHSRZHUWKDWLVODUJHO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWK)LVKHU¶VDOWKRXJKERWK
Griffin and Zeisberg locate the origins of that expansion in the specific security needs of 
the Cold War.19 While Fisher places the expansion of executive power in its foreign affairs 
context, Fisher does not claim that the security context is the central cause of expansion; 
his project is distinct in his focus on the changing approach of the Supreme Court toward 
expansive claims and the ways in which academic scholarship can support and legitimize 
³PLVFRQFHSWLRQVDERXWSUHVLGHQWLDOSRZHU´20 Fisher does not lay out a clear causal story 
and inVWHDG WDNHV DLP DW WKUHH WDUJHWV ³>F@DUHOHVV >H@UURQHRXV >G@LFWD´ ZULWWHQ E\ WKH
Supreme Court, which he contrasts with more disciplined lower court opinion writing; the 
romanticizing of presidents and presidential power by the judiciary, academics, and the 
larger public; and an unwillingness by both the public and the Court to recognize clear 
judicial mistakes (in other words, a romanticizing of the Court).21
After the judiciary began deferring to broad claims of executive power, Fisher argues 
that both constitutional principles and national welfare suffered. When presidents are left 
to their own devices, they make mistakes, argues Fisher. His inventory of such mistakes 
on the first page of Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power²mistakes that he 
addresses in detail over the course of the book²is a compelling introduction to his 
argument, given that almost every president since Truman has been implicated in some 
sort of scandal relating to deception and the unilateral exercise of executive power. 
Because of the cost to both the Constitution and national welfare when executives 
DUH DOORZHG WR RSHUDWH XQFKHFNHG )LVKHU¶V ERRN XUJHV FULWLFDO DVVHVVPHQW RI 6XSUHPH
Court opinions, as well as the scholarship that can inform those opinions²the latter of 
which can either repeat or challenge judicial errors, thereby influencing public perceptions 
of the legitimate exercise of executive power. Fisher takes particular issue with what he 
sees as the romanticizing of presidents and presidential power by scholars such as Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. (who helped popularize the sole organ doctrine/mistake) and Richard 
Neustadt.22 He traces²I am not sure how convincingly²this romanticizing of presidents 
to the behavioral movement in political science that displaced public law scholars like 
Edward Corwin, who emphasized constraints on presidential power instead of, say, the 
personal skills or ambition of a president.23 Fisher also cites an interesting study by David 
                                                          
16. Id. at 71. 
 17. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013). 
 18. MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS (2013). 
19. See GRIFFIN, supra note 17, at 79; ZEISBERG, supra note 18, at 105. 
20. FISHER, supra note 6, at 311. 
21. Id. at 11±12. 
 22. Id. at 6. 
23. Id.
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Gray Adler, which finds that introductory American government textbooks reinforce the 
idea that presidents have plenary and exclusive powers in foreign affairs and give scant 
attention to presidential mistakes.24
Fisher argues that innovations like the legislative veto exemplify a good approach 
to separation of powers: with the legislative veto, Congress and the executive branch come 
to a power sharing agreement that enables both to fulfill their respective responsibilities.25
Thus, Fisher devotes an entire chapter to the subject of legislative vetoes and the Supreme 
CRXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ INS v. Chadha,26 which struck down legislative vetoes as 
unconstitutional. Fisher also interrupts his chronological organization to devote a chapter 
to state secrets privilege, where he chastises the Court for deferring to executive assertions 
of unilateral control over information.27 It would be interesting to hear Fisher engage with 
the argument that institutional power sharing can increase executive power, as it arguably 
facilitates the delegation of powers to the executive branch. Consider, for example, 
detention and surveillance powers, both expansions of executive power which were 
arguably facilitated by institutional power sharing and the creation of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance courts. 
In President Obama, the book he published a year after Supreme Court Expansion 
of Presidential Power, Fisher states that his goal is to examine the Obama presidency 
within the context of presidents that have come after World War II.28 Fisher is particularly 
interested in comparing the constitutional positions of the Obama administration with the 
%XVK ,, DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ DQG FRPSDULQJ 2EDPD¶V HDUOLHU FULWLFLVPV RI WKH
XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RIDFWLRQVRIWKH%XVK,,DGPLQLVWUDWLRQZLWK2EDPD¶VRZQDFWLRQVDV
president.29 The book is topically organized over nine chapters, beginning with chapter 




topic, such as immigration, and then focus on the questions of continuity and change 
between, one, the policies and approaches of the Obama and Bush II administrations, and 
WZR2EDPD¶VHDUOLHUVWDWHPHQWVDQGKLVDFWLRQVDVSUHVLGHQW
)LVKHU¶VPresident Obama is thus wide-ranging, covering much ground in its 264 
pages. Ultimately, Fisher concludes that 2EDPD¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRWXUQWRXQLODWHUDODFWLRQ
when frustrated with the slow process of legislation continues the expansion of executive 
power under Bush II.30 )LVKHU LV SDUWLFXODUO\ FULWLFDO RI 2EDPD¶V HIIRUWV WR FORVH
Guantanamo, noting that Obama turns to unilateral executive action first and, in doing so, 
alienates lawmakers and thus is unable to achieve his goal of closing the facility during 
                                                          
24. Id. at 8 (citing David Gray Adler, Textbooks and the President’s Constitutional Powers, 35 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 376 (2005)). 
 25. FISHER, supra note 6, at 182±98. 
 26. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 27. FISHER, supra note 6, at 125±139. 
 28. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT OBAMA: CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS xi (2018). 
29. Id. at xii±xiii. 
 30. Id. at 259±64. 
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his administration.31 :LWK 2EDPD¶V HIIRUWV WR FORVH *XDQWDQDPR DV ZHOO DV LQ RWKHU
episodes, Fisher is eager to show that the unilateral exercise of executive power is not only 
constitutionally questionable but also frequently imprudent, resulting in policy that is 
neither good for the country nor good for the president who uses executive power so 
aggressively. IQ 2EDPD¶V HIIRUWV WR FORVH *XDQWDQDPR DV ZHOO DV KLV HQGLQJ RI
extraordinary rendition and torture, Fisher sees a contraction of executive power from the 
Bush II administration, but in other areas²most areas²Fisher identifies expansion that 
continues the precedents set by the Bush II administration and thus also represents a 
GHSDUWXUHIURP2EDPD¶VFDPSDLJQSURPLVHV7KLVSDWWHUQLVPRVWQRWDEOHLQWKHDUHDRI
executive secrecy, which Fisher is not the first to point out. 
Fisher parts ways with some critics of the Obama administration in arguing that 
2EDPD¶V HPEUDFHPHQW RI XQLODWHUDO H[HFXWLYH DFWLRQ FDQQRW EH H[SODLQHG DZD\ DV D
reaction to heightened polarization and an obstructing Congress; Fisher argues that Obama 
contributed to partisan rancor both through his rhetoric and through his unilateral exercise 
of executive power.32 Fisher notes that Obama frequently emphasized the importance of 
coming together as a country and bipartisan cooperation, but he argues that Obama 
undermined his own calls for unity by deploying his own divisive partisan rhetoric.33
)LVKHU DOVR FRQQHFWV2EDPD¶V IUHTXHQW XQLODWHUDO DFWLRQVZLWK SDUWLVDQVKLS DQG)LVKHU
pushes back against the notion that Obama was forced to turn to unilateral executive action 
because of an uncooperative &RQJUHVV)LVKHU ULJKWO\HPSKDVL]HV WKDW³2EDPDZDVQRW
IRUFHGWR>DFWXQLODWHUDOO\@,WZDVDFKRLFH´34
While Fisher identifies much continuity with the expansion of executive power 
XQGHUWKH%XVK,,DGPLQLVWUDWLRQKHDOVRKDVDFKDSWHURQ³,QGLYLGXDO5LJKWV´FKDSWHU
four), where he sees Obama departing from the path of Bush II in a constitutionally 
positive way. In the area of individual rights, Fisher argues, Obama acted consistently with 
his campaign promises and provided constitutional leadership.35 Yet this chapter is not 
REYLRXVO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH UHVW RI )LVKHU¶V DQDO\VLV:KLOH )LVKHU FULWLFL]HV2EDPD
elsewhere for too quickly turning to unilateral executive action, Fisher does not note that, 
LQKLVHIIRUWVWRUHSHDO'RQ¶W$VN'RQ¶W7HOO2EDPD worked with Congress when there 
was pressure on the left for him to act unilaterally. Similarly, Fisher also does not address 
WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FRQXQGUXPV RI WKH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V UHIXVDO WR GHIHQG WKH
Defense of Marriage Act²which, while not unprecedented, is still a notable exercise of 
executive power²QRU GRHV )LVKHU HQJDJH WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LPSOLFDWLRQV RI 2EDPD¶V
many executive actions to protect LGBT rights.36
7KHUHDGHULVOHIWZRQGHULQJZKDWWRPDNHRI2EDPD¶VXQLODWHUDODFWLRQVRQEHKDOI
of individual rights: constitutional leadership, or unconstitutional and counterproductive 
overreach? Fisher does not provide a way to reconcile these two opposing interpretations. 
:LWK WKHEHQHILW RI KLQGVLJKW)LVKHU¶VZDUQLQJ WKDW XQLODWHUDO H[HFXWLYH DFWLRn is both 
                                                          
31. Id. at 58. 
 32. Id. at 261±62. 
 33. FISHER, supra note 28, at 28±29. 
34. Id. at 34. 
35. Id. at 88. 
36. Id. at 112±16. 
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FRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\SUREOHPDWLFDQGDIRUPRI³ODZOHVVDQGFKDRWLFSROLF\PDNLQJ . . not in 
WKHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW´DSSHDUVSUHVFLHQWDVWKH7UXPSDGPLQLVWUDWLRQSURPSWO\UHYHUVHGWKH
executive actions Obama took to protect LGBT rights.37 Yet that reversal does not mean 
that the administration did not exercise constitutional leadership in protecting LGBT 
rights. While Fisher privileges a substantive approach to separation of powers over a 
formalistic one, his seemingly contradictory interpretations of unilateral actions on behalf 
RILQGLYLGXDOULJKWVVXJJHVWVWKDWSHUKDSVPRUH³VXEVWDQFH´VKRXOGEHEURXJKWLQ²or is 
being brought in²to his analysis of executive actions. In other words, procedures such as 
unilateral actions also seem to be (and should be, I think) evaluated contextually, in light 
of the constitutional ends such procedures aim to achieve. 
7REHIDLU WKRXJKLQERWKKLVERRNV)LVKHU¶VJRDOLVQHLWKHUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI
constitutional theory nor the development of doctrinal arguments for constrained executive 
power; his goal is to correct erroneous accounts of the expansion of executive power and 
to contextualize that expansion in terms of US history, longstanding constitutional 
principles, interbranch politics, and political and policy coQVHTXHQFHV.LWURVVHU¶VERRN
Reclaiming Accountability FRPSOHPHQWV )LVKHU¶V DV VKH DSSHDUV WR VKDUH PDQ\ RI
)LVKHU¶VYLHZVEXWKHUDSSURDFKLVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWUDWKHUWKDQIRFXVRQWKHSDUWLFXODUVRI
judicial and executive actions in historical context, she is interested in deconstructing 
theories of presidential supremacy and constructing a theory of accountability grounded 
in constitutional principles and doctrine. 
.LWURVVHU¶V H[SOLFLW DLP IRU WKH ILUVW KDOI RI KHU ERRN LV WR GHVFULEH WKHRULHV RI
executive supremacy and unitary executive theory, explain how these theories are linked 
WR³DUJXPHQWVIRUDEURDGSUHVLGHQWLDOSRZHUWRFRQWUROLQIRUPDWLRQ´DQGWKHQVKRZWKDW
these theories are incorrect interpretations of the Constitution.38 Kitrosser hopes that this 
first part of the book will be useful to a broad audience, and experts will likely find the 
second half of her book the most interesting. It is in the second half that she presents her 
own argument: that the Constitution positions presidents within what she calls a 
³VXEVWDQWLYH DFFRXQWDELOLW\ IUDPHZRUN´39 She contrasts this substantive accountability 
ZLWK³IRUPDODFFRXQWDELOLW\´WKHODWWHURIZKLFKIRFXVHVRQZKHWKHUPHDQVH[LVWIRURWKHU
actors to respond to the potential abuse of executive power, but not whether the 
LQIRUPDWLRQ H[LVWV WR PDNH VXFK UHVSRQVHV ³HIIHFWLYH´ 40 Substantive accountability 
focuses on both information and meaningful responses.41 Kitrosser also argues that the 
principle of substantive accountability is a constitutional principle, grounded in the First 
$PHQGPHQW &RQJUHVV¶V $UWLFOH , OHJLVODWLYH SRZHUV DQG SULQFLSOHV RI VHSDUDWLRQ RI
powers.42
.LWURVVHU¶V IRFXV RQ VXEVWDQWLYH DFFRXntability draws attention to institutional 
features of the contemporary executive that make it difficult for the other branches, and 
the public, to know what is going on inside the executive branch and thereby respond to 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 263. 
 38. HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 10 (2015). 
 39. Id. at 15. 
40. Id. at 16. 
41. Id.
42. Id. at 16±17. 
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potential abuses of power or misdeeds. For example, she notes that over one million people 
have the authority to classify documents; top-level leaks, combined with systematic over-
classification, allows presidents to control the flow of information.43 Kitrosser 
persuasively argues that this unilateral classification of information abridges the First 
Amendment and that Congress has the power to organize the executive branch to create 
external checks.44 $VZLWKPDQ\RIKHUH[DPSOHVDQGLQ)LVKHU¶VDFFRXQWVDVZHOOWKH
reality of an enormous and complex bureaucracy, made up of competing interests, cuts 
against formulations of the executive branch as unitary. Kitrosser highlights a number of 
potential institutional reforms that Congress could, through its legislative powers, 
undertake. Some examples of her suggestions include a law requiring the Attorney General 
to disclose to Congress interpretations by the Department of Justice that find a law 
unconstitutional on Article II grounds45; statutory constraints on the state secrets 
privilege46; and statutes that ensure certain positions in the executive branch can be 
dismissed for cause only (something also discussed by Fisher).47 Like Fisher, she also 
argues that courts have abdicated their responsibility in a number of cases when they 
simply accept executive assertions of state secrets privilege and do not conduct in camera 
review.48
.LWURVVHU¶VDQDO\VLVVWDQGVRXWLQKHUDWWHQWLRQWRWKHZD\VLQZKLFKFKDQJLQJYLHZV
on the legitimate exercise of executive power circulate between elected officials, courts, 
the public, and the academic community. In her concern with public acceptance of claims 
of judicial supremacy, and how academic and legal discourse contribute to that acceptance, 
.LWURVVHU¶VERRNRYHUODSVZLWK)LVKHU¶V6KHWDNHVWKLVSRLQWIXUWKHUWKDn Fisher, though, 
in linking the legitimation of expansive executive power to the presidential power to alter 
the policy status quo. Kitrosser explains, for example, how presidents have legitimated 
presidential secrecy by asserting broad claims to executive privilege and then keeping 
information secret. 49 If Congress or the courts do not immediately challenge this assertion 
and practice of executive privilege, then the contours of what is viewed as the legitimate 
exercise of executive privilege expands. In other words, the status quo²that is, executive 
secrecy²is legitimated as the public witness the executive make broad claims of executive 
privilege and have those claims succeed.50
Both Kitrosser and Fisher overlook an additional dimension in this unvirtuous circle 
RIH[SDQGLQJH[HFXWLYHSRZHUWKHSUHVLGHQW¶VLQIRUPDOSRZHUVWRVHWWKHDJHQGDDQGIUDPH
public debates over the legitimate exercise of power. In other words, presidents have an 
advantage in constitutional debates over the legitimate exercise of power not only by their 
ability to quickly alter the policy status quo, but also by their power to shape the discursive 
status quo. This power, long recognized in the political science literature on the presidency, 
was on clear display with public reception RI 6SHFLDO &RXQVHO 5REHUW 0XHOOHU¶V
                                                          
43. KITROSSER, supra note 38, at 16, 62. 
 44. Id. at 16±17. 
 45. Id. at 104. 
 46. Id. at 123. 
47. Id. at 164±65. 
 48. KITROSSER, supra note 38, at 113±42. 
49. Id. at 57. 
50. Id.
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investigation of the Trump administration. As Katy Harriger has argued, legal officials 
will always be at a disadvantage with confronting executive abuse of power in public 
arenas, as their authority depends upon their neutrality, their window of opportunity to 
persuade the public is limited, and that opportunity only comes after presidents have had 
weeks, if not months or years, to defend their actions to the public.51
Fisher dedicated his Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power to Justice 
Jackson, who wrote in Youngstown³:LWKDOOLWVGHIHFWVGHOD\VDQGLQFRQYHQLHQFHVPHQ
have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the 
Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliDPHQWDU\GHOLEHUDWLRQV´52
%RWK )LVKHU DQG .LWURVVHU DSSHDU WR VWURQJO\ DJUHH ZLWK -DFNVRQ¶V RSLQLRQ $QG OLNH
Jackson in Youngstown, Fisher and Kitrosser practice what they preach. These three books 
are written not only for legal experts, but for a broad public: for the executive to be under 
the law, the public has to view presidential supremacy as the constitutional violation and 
threat to public welfare that it indeed is. 
                                                          
 51. See Katy J. Harriger, The Law: The President and the Independent Counsel: Reflections on Prosecutors, 
Presidential Prerogatives, and Political Power, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 338 (2001). 
 52. FISHER, supra note 6, at 123 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952)). 
